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TAX COURT DECISIONS ON FAMILY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS AID BOTH TAXPAYERS AND IRS
by
Martin H. Zem*

I. INTROUDUCTION
In the complex arena of estate and gift taxation,
controversies frequently arise between taxpayers and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) concerning the value of
property gifted or owed at death. Since the estate and gift taxes
are based upon the valuation of property - determined at the
time of death or at the time of the gift- taxpayers generally
attempt to minimize values whereas the IRS attempts to
maximize them. 1
A sophisticated estate planning structure for minimizing
values, or at least endeavoring to do so, is the family limited
partnership. Typically, property is transferred to a newly
formed limited partnership by a well-to-do taxpayer followed
by transfers of partnership interests to children or other family
members as gifts. Often, the property transferred to the
partnership consists partly or entirely of publicly traded
securities for which market values are readily available. The
transfer of partnership interests may be outright, to custodial
accounts or in trust. A valuation discount for the gifts of the
partnership interests is then claimed for their alleged lack of
marketability, which is based partly upon restrictions on
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transferability contained in the partnership agreement. A
further discount is claimed for the fact that the partnership
interests gifted are minority interests. Accordingly, the
claimed value of the gift is based not upon the value of the
publicly traded securities transferred to the partnership, but the
allegedly considerably lower value of the partnership interests
resulting from minority and marketability discounts. The IRS
has attacked the family limited partnership divide over the
years with mixed results using a variety of Internal Revenue
Code provisions. 2 [t particularly frowns on the transfer of
publicly traded securities to a family limited partnership,
especially where the creation of the partnership, the transfers of
the securities to it and the gifts of the partnership interests
occur practically simultaneously. Two Tax Court cases of
fairly recent vintage, one decided in 2000 and another in 2004,
favored the IRS position. The IRS was less successful,
however, in a Tax Court case decided in May of 2008,
Hollman v. Commissioner, 3 and in a follow up case with
similar facts decided in September of 2008, Bianca Gross v.
Commissioner. 4

II. EARILER TAX COURT DECISIONS FAVORING THE
IRS.
A Tax Court decision in 2000, Shepherd v.
Commissioner, was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit in 2002. 5
In Shepherd, the taxpayer transferred real property and shares
of publicly traded stock to a newly-formed limited partnership
in which he was a 50% owner and each of his two sons were
25% owners. Rather than allocating the value of the property
transferred to the taxpayer's capital account, the value was
allocate, pursuant to the partnership agreement, pr rat based on
ownership. Accordingly, 50% was allocated to the taxpayer 's
capital account and 25% was allocated to each of the capital
accounts of his two sons. The transfer of the property to the
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partnership and the transfers of the interests in the partnership
occurred on the same day. The IRS asserted that the transfer of
the property to the partnership was an indirect gift of the
property itself to the sons and not a gift of the partnership
interests (with a claimed discounted value). Because the
noncontributing partners' capital accounts were enhanced by
the contribution of the taxpayer, the Tax Court held that the
transfers were indirect gifts by the taxpayer to his sons of
undivided 25-percent interests in the real property and shares
of stock. No discounts were allowed for minority and
marketability discounts on the gifts of the partnership interest
to the sons.
A Tax Court decision in 2004, Senda v. Commissioner,
was affirmed by the Eight Circuit in 2006. 6 In Senda, the
taxpayers transferred shares of publicly traded stock to two
family limited partnerships, coupled with transfers of limited
partnership interests to their children. As in Shepherd, the
transfers took place the same day. The Tax Court found: "At
best, the transfers were integrated (as asserted by respondent)
and, in effect, simultaneous." The transfers of the shares of
stock to the partnerships were held to be indirect gifts of the
shares to the children. Again, no minority and marketability
discounts were allowed.
Ill. HOLLMAN v. COMMISSIONER
The Tax Court decided the Hollman case7 in May, 2008.
The case has stirred up some controversy, but should give
aggressive estate and gift tax practitioners some hope of
successfully asserting minority and marketability discounts if
the estate plan is structured correctly. On the other hand, the
discounts allowed probably will not be as much as sought.
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A. Facts

The taxpayers, husband and wife, had four minor
children. The husband, Thomas Hollman (Tom), was
employed by Dell Computer Corp. (Dell) from 1988 through
November of 2001. During the course of his employment,
Tom received substantial stock options, some of which he
exercised. Additionally, he purchased shares of Dell Stock.
As the wealth of the taxpayers increased, they became
concerned with managing it, particularly as to how it might
affect their children. With this in mind, beginning in 1996 and
continuing into 1999, they transferred Dell stock to custodial
accounts (Under the Texas Uniform Transfers to Minors Act)
for each of their three daughters. Tom's mother (Janelle)
ultimately wound up as the custodian after Tom resigned.
In 1997, the taxpayers met with an estate planning
attorney who advised them of the gift tax savings from
valuation discounts of gifts of limited partnership interests
rather than of gifts of the property contributed to the limited
partnership. In 1999, following the advice of the attorney, the
taxpayers formed an irrevocable trust (the trust), naming
themselves as grantors, Janelle as trustee and their children as
beneficiaries. The taxpayers executed the trust on September
10, 1999, Janelle executed it on November4, 1999, and the
trust stated it was effective September l 0, 1999. One hundred
shares of Dell stock and $10,000 were transferred into the trust.
The taxpayers also executed a limited partnership agreement on
November 2, 1999. 8 Janelle executed it thereafter. On
November 2, 1999, Janelle, as trustee, transferred the 100
shares of Dell stock to the limited partnership in exchange for a
partnership interest. On the same date, the taxpayers
transferred 70,000 shares of Dell stock to the partnership in
exchange for partnership interests.
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Tom testified that the reason for setting up the family
limited partnership was long-term growth, asset protection and
preservation. He stated his concern that a direct gift to his
children might de-motivate them: "We did not want our
daughters to just go blow this money." He also stated he was
concerned about protecting the assets from friends , spouses and
potential creditors and wanted something to educate his
daughters on business matters.
On November 8, 1999, the taxpayers made a gift of
limited partnership interests to Janelle, both as custodian under
the state's Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) and as trustee.
On December 13, 1999, further transfers of Dell stock, in
exchange for partnership interests, were made from custodial
accounts for the taxpayers' children set up under UGMA. As a
result of the transfers, the trust wound up owning about 49% of
the partnership interests, custodial accounts wound up owning
about 40% of the partnership interests, and the taxpayers
wound up owning general and limited partnership interest
comprising the other 11%. Considerably less significant
transfers to partnership interests were made in 200 l and 2002.
The limited partnership agreement contained a number
of restrictive provisions that the taxpayers claimed affected the
value of the partnership interests. The more salient were: (1)
restrictions on withdrawing from the partnership, (2)
restrictions on assigning partnership interests, (3) a provision
requiring unanimous consent of all partners to dissolve the
partnership and wind up its affairs, and (4) a reacquisition
provision giving the partnership the option to acquire nonpermitted assignments on favorable terms. An important
finding of the Tax Court was that upon formation of the
partnership, Tom had no immediate plans for it other than to
hold Dell stock. At no time did the partnership have a business
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plan and its assts consisted solely of Dell stock. Furthermore,
the partnership had neither employees nor a telephone listing.
The taxpayers filed gift tax returns for 1999 making a
9
split gift election. On this basis, Tom and his wife each
claimed a gift of $601,827. This amount was based upon an
independent appraisal of the limited partnership interests
transferred with the appraiser applying a hefty 49.25% discount
from the value of the underlying Dell shares themselves. The
value reported for each of the taxpayers on the 2000 gifts of
partnership interests, after the same discount, was $40,000, and
likewise for the 200 l gifts.
On audit of the gift tax returns, the IRS claimed that the
transfer of the Dell stock to the limited partnership was in
substance an indirect gift of the stock to the other partners
within the meaning of IRC § 2511. 10 As an alternative
argument, the IRS claimed that the partnership was more
analogous to a trust than to an operating business, and should
be valued as such. The IRS also claimed that the restrictive
provisions contained in the partnership agreement should be
disregarded for valuation purposes pursuant to IRC §
2703(a)(2). 11 As another alternative argument, in the event the
indirect transfer argument was not upheld, the IRS allowed a
discount of only 28%, valuing each of the split gifts at
$871,971. Similar adjustments were made for the 2001 and
2002 gift tax returns. Overall, the IRS increased the value of
12
the gifts by over $660,000.

B. Tax Court Analysis
The Court noted that it was asked to compare the facts
at hand to the Senda and Shepherd cases. It observed that in
both of those cases the transfer of the stock and the transfer of
the partnership interests occurred on the same day and were
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thus integrated transactions. The facts in the instant case were
held to be distinguishable. On November 2, 1999, the
partnership was formed and the taxpayers transferred 70,000
Dell shares to it. Also, on that date, Janelle transferred 100
Dell shares to the partnership. In exchange, the taxpayers and
Janelle received partnership interests proportionate to the
number of shares transferred. It was not until November 8,
1999, 6 days later, that the taxpayers made gifts ofpartnership
interests to Janelle both as a custodian and trustee of the trust.
Since there were no simultaneous transfers as in the Shepherd
and Senda cases, those cases were distinguished as being
materially different on the facts.

larger transaction. The IRS noted that a Treasury Department
regulation dealing with indirect gifts is specifically in point. 15
Its argument in substance was that for the taxable year 1999,
the separation in time between the first two steps (formation of
the partnership and funding of it) and the third step (the gift of
the partnership interests) served no purpose other than to avoid
making an indirect gift per the regulation. 16 The Court refused
to automatically conclude, however, that the hiatus of only
about one week between formation and funding of the
partnership and the gifts of the partnership interests resulted in
the transactions being so intertwined that one step without the
other would have been fruitless.

Having differentiated the Shepherd and Senda cases,
the Court moved on to an alternative argument of the IRS,
namely, that the transfers were indirect gifts under the "step
transaction doctrine." Although the step transaction doctrine
has been applied mostly in income tax cases, it has been
13
applied in estate and gift tax cases.

In its arguments, the IRS relied heavily on Senda,
where funding of the partnership and gifts of partnership
interests occurred on the same day. The Court found Senda
distinguishable: "The passage of time may be indicative of a
change in circumstances that give independent significance to a
partner's transfer of property to a partnership and the
subsequent gift of an interest in that partnership to another."
Highly relevant was the Court's observation that stock values
could significantly change within one week. In fact, the Dell
stock went down 1.316 percent within one week. Although
this may not seem like much , based on the time elapsed, the
rate of change was noted to be greater than the changes that
took place in subsequent longer relative periods. The IRS even
conceded that a two-month delay from funding to gifts would
give independent significance to the two steps. The Court did
not draw any "bright line" test as to how much time must
elapse between the funding of a partnership and a gift of
partnership units for there to be economic risk of a change in
the value ofthe partnership units gifted. 18 Based on the facts
of the case, it concluded that the 1999 gifts of partnership units
was not an indirect gift of Dell shares.

14

Referring to a prior Tax Court decision, the Court
observed that the step transaction doctrine combines a series of
integrated, interdependent steps into one step if the series of
steps are focused on a particular result. It noted that although
there is no universal test as to when and how the step
transaction doctrine should be applied, the courts have used
three alternative tests: (1) binding commitment, (2)
interdependence and (3) end result. Although the IRS did not
explicitly state which of these tests it was relying upon, the
Court believed that it was arguing that the " interdependence"
test was applicable.
Under the interdependence test the courts look to
whether the separate steps each have legal significance or are
so intertwined that they have significance only as part of a

17
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After determining hat there was no indirect gift of Dell
Shares, but rather a gift of limited partnership interests, the
Court next concentrated on valuing the interests. In this regard,
it focused on Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 2703. In
pertinent part, I.R.C. § 2703(a) provides that the value of gifted
property is determined without regard to any restriction on the
right to sell or use such property. However, I.R.C. § 2703(b)
states that I.R.C. § 2703(a) shall not apply if the restriction
meets each of three requirements:
( l) It is a bona fide business arrangement.
(2) It is not a device to transfer the gifted property to
members of the decedent's 19 family for less than full
and adequate consideration in money or money's worth.
(3) Its terms are comparable to similar arrangements
entered into by persons in an arm's length transaction.
The partnership contained several relevant restrictions:
(I) with limited exceptions, a restriction on assigning a
partnership interest without consent of all of the partners, (2)
an option to reacquire the interest transferred in the event of a
non-permitted assignment, and (3) restrictions on payouts to
reacquire a non-permitted assignment. The taxpayers argued
that these restrictions served a bona fide business purpose by
preventing interests in the partnership from passing to nonfamily members citing a number of cases in support of their
argument. 20 The IRS on the other hand argued that the
transaction was not a bona fide business arrangement since
"carrying on a business" requires more than holding securities
and keeping records, citing a 1941 Supreme Court income tax
21
case, Higgins v. Commissioner. Moreover, it observed that
the taxpayers primary purpose in forming the partnership, to

20 l 0/Tax Court Decisions/42

preserve their wealth and educate their children about it, were
both personal and business goals.
The Court observed that I.R.C. § 2703 does not contain
a definition of the phrase "bona fide business arrangement."
However, the Court noted that there could be a bona fide
business arrangement without an actively managed business,
citing Estate ofAmlie v. Commissioner. 22 In that case, the
Court held that a fiduciary's efforts to hedge risk and planning
for liquidity needs of a decedent's estate constitute business
purposes under I.R.C. § 2703(b)( l ). The Court then went on to
observe that although buy-sell agreements serve a legitimate
purpose in maintaining control of a business, this does not
necessarily exclude the possibility that such an agreement is a
tax-avoidance testamentary divide to be disregarded in valuing
the property interest.
Reviewing the legislative history of J.R.C. § 2703(b)(I),
the Court concluded that the restrictions in the partnership
agreement in this case did not constitute a bona fide business
arrangement. First of all, there was no closely held business to
protect. The restrictions served principally to discourage
dissipation by the children of the family wealth. This was
different than the value fixing arrangements in Estate of
Amlie, 23 which involved a conservator seeking to exercise
prudent management of investments for his ward and to
provide for the liquidity needs of her estate.
The Court then focused on whether the second
requirement for disregarding the restrictions in the partnership
agreement, I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2), was met. This provision
mandates that the restriction not be a divide to transfer property
to members of the decedent' s24 fami Iy for inadequate
consideration. The Court concluded that the restrictions were
such a divide. The purpose of the partnership restrictions was
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to discourage the taxpayer's children from dissipating the
wealth transferred to them. If a child made an impermissible
transfer, the child would not realize the difference between fair
market value of his partnership unit and the unit's
proportionate share of the partnership's net asset value.
Further, if a child made an impermissible transfer, the
partnership could redeem the interest transferred from the
transferee for less than the net asset value proportionate to the
impermissible transferee's interest in the partnership. The
difference in value would inure to the benefit of the remaining
children and therefore be a redistribution of wealth from a child
pursuing an impermissible transfer to the remaining children,
an impermissible "device."
The third requirement that must be met for restriction to
be disregarded in valuation, I.R.C. § 2703(b )(3), is that the
restriction be comparable to similar arrangements entered into
by persons in an arm's-length transaction. Comfsarability is
5
determined at the time the restriction is created. In this
regard, there was a battle between expert witnesses. The IRS
expert, a law professor, testified that in his opinion - based
upon his experience and conversations with numerous
practitioners- it was unlikely that a person in an arm's-length
transaction would accept the pertinent restrictions in the
partnership agreement.
The taxpayers called another law professor as its expert
who had practiced, written and lectured about partnership
taxation and law for more than 20 years, and who had drafted
numerous limited partnership agreements. His testimony was
that the restrictions were comparable to provisions often found
in partnership agreements among unrelated partners or were
not out of the mainstream. Here, the Court seemed to fudge a
little, stating that even if it found that the restrictions were
similar to arrangement entered into in an arm's length
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transaction satisfying I.R.C. § 2703(b)(3), it would still not
disregard the restriction since they did not constitute a bona
fide business arrangement under I.R.C. § 2703(b )(I), and were
a prohibited device under I.R.C. § 2703(b)(2). Accordingly, it
determined that it did not have to decide whether the IRS or the
taxpayer was correct in applying the arm's-length standard of
I.R.C. § 2703(b)(3). 26
As a final matter, the Court had to address to what
extent minority and marketability discounts should be allowed,
disregarding any marketability discount attributable to
restrictions in the partnership agreement. Since the contending
parties agreed that such discounts should be allowed, the battle
then became one of the expert witnesses as to the specific
discount percentages. The Court then went into lengthy
discussion of the testimony and methodologies of the experts.
The minority discounts claimed by the experts different for
each o the three years at issue. Following are the respective
discounts claimed by the parties and the amount ultimately
allowed by the Court.
Year
1999
2000
2001

IRS Expert
11 .2%
13.4
5.0

Taxpayer Expert
13.4%
16.3
10.0

Court
11.32%
14.34
4.63

With respect to a marketability discount, the amount
claimed by the parties did not differ from year to year. The
expert for the taxpayers testified that his analysis supported a
marketability discount of at least 35%, settling on that amount
as his testimony, whereas the IRS expert estimated that the
marketability discount should be only 12.5%. The Court
adopted the latter figure. Accordingly, it is clear that the
opinion of the IRS expert as to both minority and marketability
discounts held greater sway with the Court. In dollar terms, the
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discounts allowed reduced the size of the taxable gifts by
approximately $607,000.

major gift of partnership units in 1999 came to only about 25% .
It is not clear why the IRS stipulated to a higher percentage.

IV. BIANCE GROSS v. COMMISSIONER

V. CONCLUSION

As noted earlier, the Tax Court decided Bianca Gross v.
Commissione/ 7 in September of2008, a few months after its
Hollman decision. The decision in Biance Gross was rendered
by the same judge.

Overall, Hollman is a significant taxpayer victory
although the IRS got in its licks winning the I.R.C. § 2703
argument. Siding with the taxpayers, the Court held that the
gifts were of limited partnership interest rather than indirect
gifts of stock. This finding resulted in the Court accepting that
minority and marketability discounts of the limited partnership
gifts were appropriate. Favoring the IRS, however, no discount
was allowed for the restrictions in the partnership agreement
since I.R.C. § 2703 was found applicable mandating that these
restrictions be disregarded. Consequently, the taxpayers did
not get as large of a minority and marketability discount on the
limited partnership interest gifted as they claimed. One may
speculate though that the taxpayers did not expect to get the
discounts claimed and perhaps hoped that the judge would
proverbially "split the baby in half." As noted, however, the
Court for the most part sided with the IRS on the amount of
discounts to be allowed mostly adopting those offered by the
IRS expert. Significantly, the IRS was successful in
interposing I.R.C. § 2703 as being applicable to the Hollman
type of situation involving publicly traded securities.
Restrictions in a limited partnership agreement are often put in
for the principal purpose, or at least a major one, of increasing
the amount claimed for a marketability discount. So, although
some discount was allowed for marketability in Hollman, the
effect of disregarding such restrictions was to reduce the
amount of discount.

Over a period of about three months in 1998, the
taxpayer transferred in excess of $2 million of publicly traded
stock to a limited partnership she had formed. Eleven days
after the final transfer to the partnership, the taxpayer gifted
22.5 percent partnership interests to each of her two daughters.
The taxpayer was the sole general partner. She testified that
the purpose for forming the limited partnership was to have her
two daughters working together in handling the family wealth.
A combined minority and marketability discount of 35% was
claimed on the gifts of the partnership interests. The IRS
asserted that no discounts should be allowed raising essentially
the same argument that it had asserted in Hollman, namely, that
there was an indirect gift of the securities themselves. Again,
the IRS also raised its "step transaction" argument.
Applying its Hollman rationale, the Court held that the
ll days that transpired between the funding of the partnership
and the gifts of partnership units posed a real economic risk
that the partnership's value would change during this time.
This was especially true since the property transferred to the
partnership was heavily-traded, volatile common stocks. The
IRS had stipulated to the taxpayer' s 35% discount if it lost on
the indirect gift argument and this is the discount that the Court
adopted. It should be noted that the combined discount
ultimately adopted by the Court in Hollman with respect to the

Hollman may perhaps present a roadmap for obtaining
discounts on transfers of publicly held stock into a limited
partnership followed by gifts of the partnership interests.
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Clearly, there must be a hiatus between the two events. In
Hollman, the break was about one week. The Court in a
footnote, however, noted that its decision might have been
different if the property being transferred were less volatile,
such as preferred stock or treasury bonds. The Court did not
give any guidance as to how long the hiatus must be, although
as noted, the IRS seems to conclude that a two-month delay
would suffice. In this regard, the IRS did not dispute that a
sufficient period of time had elapsed between the formation of
the limited partnership and the gifts of the partnership units in
2000 and 2001. Clearly, a taxpayer's position is stronger the
longer the delay between the two events, taking into account
the volatility of the securities transferred. In Bianca Gross, the
taxpayers were, of course, on even more stable ground where
the hiatus was 11 days.

ENDNOTES
1

Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C) § 2501(a) imposes a gift tax on
the transfer of property by gift during the year, based upon the
value of the gifts made during the year. The gift tax
regulations (Treasury Regulation (Reg.)§ 25.2511-2(a))
provide that the value of property gifted is determined by the
value of the property passing from the donor and not
necessarily the measure of enrichment to the donee. The gift
tax applies whether the gift is direct or indirect (I.R.C.§ 2511).
Also, see Reg .. § 25.2511-I(h)(l) concluding that a transfer to a
corporation for less than full and adequate consideration is an
indirect gift to the other shareholders of the corporation. There
is a gift tax exclusion per donee per year of $12,000 in 2008,
which is indexed for inflation to the next lowest multiple of
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$1000 (IRC § 2503(b)). Effective January 1, 2009, the annual
exclusion was adjusted upward to $13,000. Also excludable
are certain gift transfers for educational or medical expenses
(IRC § 2503(e)). A split gift election by husband and wife
double the amount excludable (IRC § 2513). Over and above
the annual gift tax exclusion, there is a lifetime gift tax credit
that in effect exempts $1 ,000,000 in value of property gifted
from gift tax liability (IRC § 2505). The comparable estate tax
exemption was $2,000.000 through 2008 and rose to
$3,500,000 effective January 1, 2009 (IRC § 20 10). Gifts over
the annual exclusion made during lifetime effectively reduce
the estate tax exemption. Under current law, there is no estate
tax in 2010, but it reinstates in 2011 reverting to an exemption
of$1,000,000. Legislation in 2009, however, will probably
change all this since a new Administration and Congress have
taken over. Current speculation is that the $3,500,000
exemption will be made permanent, that the estate tax will not
be repealed for 2010, and that the top estate and gift tax rate
will be capped at 45%.
2
The other Code provisions that the IRS has used to attack
family limited partnership divide are beyond the scope of this
paper. For background, however, see Edward A Renn and N.
Todd Angkatavanich, The Resurrection, Trusts and Estates
Magazine, October 2008, at 20.
3
130 T.C. 112.
4
T.C. Memo. 2008-221.
5
115 T.C. 376 (2000), aff'd. 283 F.3d 1258 (11 th Cir. 2002).
6
T.C. Memo 2004-160, aff'd. 433 F.3d 1044 (8 1h Cir. 2006).
7
Supra, Note 3.
8
Technically, the partnership was formed on November 3,
1999, when a certificate of limited partnership was filed with
the secretary of state.
9
Treating gifts made as being made one-half by each spouse
(I.R.C. § 2513).
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I.R.C. § 2511 imposes a gift tax whether the transfer is in
trust or otherwise, and whether the gift is direct or indirect.
11
I.R.C. § 2703(a)(2) provides that the value of any property
shall be determined without regard to any restriction on the
right to sell or use such property. The IRS initially also relied
on I.R.C. § 2704(b), which provides that certain restrictions on
liquidation of a partnership shall be disregarded in valuing it;
however, it abandoned its reliance on this section.
12
It may be noted that the unified exclusion amount in 1999
was $650,000, and in 2000-2001 it was $675,000. The case
did not indicate whether prior gifts had been made dipping in
to the exclusion amount. In any event, to the extent the
exclusion amount is used to offset lifetime gifts, that much less
remains as an estate tax exclusion. The taxpayers thus had an
interest in using up less of their unified exclusion amount.
13
See, e.g., Daniels v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1994-59.
14
Santa Montica Pictures, L.L.C. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo 2005-104.
15
If none of the individual events occurring between the
contribution of the property to the partnership and the gifts of
partnership interests had any significance independent of its
status as an intermediate step in the donors' plan to transfer
their assets to their donees in partnerships form, the formation,
funding, and transfer of partnership units pursuant to an
integrated plan is treated as a gift of the assets to a partnership
ofwhich the donees are the other partners (Reg.§ 25.2511l(h)( 1)).
16
The IRS conceded that there was sufficient hiatus for the
2001 and 2002 gifts of partnership interests for them to be
treated as separate transactions.
17
Supra, Note 6.
18
The Court noted that the Dell stock was a heavily traded,
relatively volatile common stock and that it might view the
impact of a six day hiatus differently if the property being

201 0/Tax Court Decisions/ 50

transferred were preferred stock or a long-term Government
bond.
19
Since I.R.C. § 2703 is applicable both to estate and gift taxes,
the section should have used the term "taxpayer's family"
rather than " decedent' s family. " Also, see Reg. § 25.27031(b )(1 )(ii), which substitutes "the natural objects of the
transferor's bounty" for the phrase "members of the decedent' s
family" apparently because I.R.C. § 2703 is interpreted as
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Reg.§ 25.2703-l(b)(l)(iii).
Actually, the Court did not have to consider the applicability
ofi.R.C. § 2703(b)(2) either since I.R.C. § 2703(b)(l) was
failed. Each of the provisions, (b)(1 ), (b )(2) and (b)(3) have to
be met for l.R.C. § 2703 to be disregarded. For some reason
the Court reviewed the applicability of I.R.C. § 2703(b )(2)
although technically it did not have to. Perhaps it felt that
failing two out of the three requirements for disregarding I.R.C.
§ 2703 buttressed its holding. In any event, the restrictions in
the partnership agreement were disregarded in valuing the
artnership units gifted.
7
Supra, Note 4.
26

y

